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Abstract
Can a transfer of wealth from the US to the least developed coun-
tries be Pareto improving? We analyze this question in an open-
economy R&D-based growth model, in which the high-income (low-
income) country produces innovative (homogenous) goods. We nd
that wealth redistribution to the low-income country simultaneously
reduces global inequality and increases growth through an increase
in labor supply in the high-income country. Given that the market
equilibrium of R&D-based growth models is usually ine¢ cient due to
R&D externalities, the wealth redistribution may lead to a Pareto im-
provement, which occurs if the discount rate is su¢ ciently low or R&D
productivity is su¢ ciently high.
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To require the President to develop and implement a com-
prehensive strategy to further the United States foreign policy
objective of promoting the reduction of global poverty, the elim-
ination of extreme global poverty, and the achievement of the
Millennium Development Goal of reducing by one-half the pro-
portion of people worldwide, between 1990 and 2015, who live on
less than $1 per day. - Global Poverty Act of 2007
1 Introduction
A recent report by the World Bank shows that about 1.4 billion people live
in extreme poverty as of 2005.1 The World Bank denes extreme poverty
as living on less than US$1.25 per day meaning that the victims of extreme
poverty are often unable to meet basic needs for food, water, shelter, san-
itation, and health care.2 Some economists have proposed increasing anti-
poverty aid from developed countries to reduce global poverty. For example,
Sachs (2005) urges developed countries, such as the US, to set aside 0.7 per-
cent of the gross national product for global poverty reduction. However,
critiques are sometimes outraged by the potential tax burden on the citi-
zens.3 The purpose of this study is to show that this kind of global wealth
redistribution may be Pareto improving through innovation and economic
growth.
This paper develops an open-economy R&D-based growth model to ana-
lyze the e¤ects of cross-country wealth redistribution on innovation, economic
growth and global welfare. Specically, we extend the canonical quality-
ladder model into a two-country setting. The high-income country (e.g. the
US) produces innovative goods while the low-income country produces ho-
mogenous goods. Within this framework, a transfer of wealth to the low-
income country stimulates innovation through an increase in labor supply in
the high-income country. Intuitively, the wealth transfer increases the mar-
ginal utility of wealth of households in the high-income country and hence
1For more information, see http://go.worldbank.org/CUQLLRX1Q0
2See, for example, Sachs (2005) for an excellent discussion on the problems of poverty
in developing countries.
3See, for example, Cline (2008) and Schlay (2008).
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reduces their consumption of leisure. Therefore, when the high-income coun-
try owns a major share of wealth in the world, redistribution can simulta-
neously reduce global inequality and increase growth through elastic labor
supply. Given that the market equilibrium of R&D-based growth models is
usually ine¢ cient due to R&D externalities, the redistribution may improve
both countrieswelfare. We show that a Pareto improvement occurs if the
discount rate is su¢ ciently low or R&D productivity is su¢ ciently high.
International transfers have been an important issue in international eco-
nomics, and previous studies (to be discussed below) mostly focus on its
welfare e¤ects through trade. While the static trade e¤ects are undoubtably
important and have received careful analysis, the present study highlights
the importance of a dynamic welfare e¤ect of international transfers through
economic growth. For this purpose, it is necessary to consider a growth-
theoretic framework. Furthermore, the US is a country at the world tech-
nology frontier so that innovation is one of the most important channels to
achieve growth in the long run. Therefore, we consider an innovation-driven
growth model. Also, there is supportive empirical evidence for a negative
relationship between wealth and labor supply, which is the key mechanism
behind the results of the present study.4
This paper also relates to the issue of R&D underinvestment. Empir-
ical studies often nd that the social return to R&D is much higher than
the private return.5 Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) apply these empirical
estimates to an R&D-based growth model and nd that the socially opti-
mal level of R&D is at least two to four times higher than the market level.
Therefore, overcoming this market failure of R&D underinvestment would
stimulate innovation, increase R&D towards the social optimum and achieve
a higher level of social welfare. Featuring this prominent market distortion,
the R&D-based growth model with elastic labor supply is a suitable frame-
work for analyzing the distortion-correcting e¤ect of international transfers.
In the trade literature on international transfers, it is well-known since
Samuelson (1947) that if there is no distortion and the equilibrium is stable,
then the donating (aid-receiving) country must be worse o¤ (better o¤). In
the presence of distortions, Bhagwati et al. (1983) and others show that the
4See, for example, Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) for a useful summary of
empirical studies that nd a negative relationship between wealth and labor supply. They
also emphasize the importance of elastic labor supply on income inequality in the AK
growth model, but wealth redistribution does not a¤ect growth in their model.
5See Griliches (1992) for a review of this literature.
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donating (aid-receiving) country may become better o¤ (worse o¤), and this
phenomenon is known as the transfer paradox. Turunen-Red and Woodland
(1988) consider a multilateral transfer and show that a Pareto improvement
may occur but only if tari¤ distortions exist. The present study relates to
these seminal studies by considering R&D underinvestment as a dynamic
distortion that is inherent in the US economy and can be corrected by inter-
national transfers. In an overlapping generations (OLG) model, Galor and
Polemarchakis (1987) show that the transfer paradox may also occur due to
the nite planning horizon of agents.6 Benarroch and Gaisford (2004) con-
sider Pareto-improving foreign aid in a North-South product-cycle model in
which production exhibits learning by doing and new products are introduced
exogenously overtime.7 The present study di¤ers from these interesting stud-
ies by analyzing the important roles of market-based innovation and R&D
underinvestment on Pareto-improving transfers.
This paper also relates to the literature on inequality and growth.8 The
early studies of this literature focus on the e¤ects of inequality on physical
and human capital accumulation. For example, Bertola (1993), Alesina and
Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) nd that when inequality
leads to a redistribution through political mechanisms, the higher tax on cap-
ital income is detrimental to growth. In contrast, Galor and Zeira (1993) and
Aghion and Bolton (1997) nd that in the presence of credit constraints, re-
distribution may stimulate capital accumulation. In a model in which growth
is initially driven by physical capital and subsequently by human capital, Ga-
lor and Moav (2004) show that inequality increases (decreases) growth in the
early (later) stages of development. While these studies focus on the e¤ects of
inequality on capital accumulation, the present study is related to a more re-
cent sub-literature that analyzes the e¤ects of inequality on innovation-driven
growth. In this literature, the di¤erent channels through which inequality
a¤ects growth can be broadly assigned to two categories (i) supply of factor
inputs for R&D and (ii) demand for innovative goods (to be discussed be-
low). Although the present study considers a two-country model, the global
economy can also be viewed as a single country and the two countries can be
relabeled as two types of households, who supply di¤erent labor inputs and
6Cremers and Sen (2008) take into account transition dynamics and show that the
possibility of a transfer paradox in the OLG model is robust.
7Shimomura (2007) also considers a dynamic North-South model and relates Pareto-
improving foreign aid to indeterminacy.
8See Bertola et al. (2006) for an excellent textbook treatment of this literature.
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own di¤erent shares of national wealth. In this case, redistribution across
countries is isomorphic to redistribution across households.
Chou and Talmain (1996) develop a variety-expanding model with elastic
labor supply and show that if and only if the elasticity of substitution be-
tween leisure and consumption di¤ers from unity, wealth redistribution across
households would a¤ect growth through aggregate labor supply. While Chou
and Talmain (1996) provide an early and interesting analysis on the e¤ects
of wealth redistribution on innovation-driven growth and social welfare, they
point out that the growth rate and labor supply become non-stationary in
their model under a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between leisure
and consumption. In other words, wealth redistribution having an e¤ect on
growth is incompatible with balanced growth in the Chou-Talmain model.
The present study continues to analyze the role of elastic labor supply on
inequality and growth but allows for di¤erent types of labor based on the
common perception that it is the supply of high-skill labor that contributes
to growth. In this more realistic framework, redistribution a¤ects growth
under the conventional unitary elasticity of substitution between leisure and
consumption.
Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) also explore the relationship between
redistribution and growth through the supply of factor inputs for R&D. In
particular, they analyze the e¤ect of risk aversion on occupational choice.
Their idea is that R&D entrepreneurship is a risky career; thus, the insur-
ance e¤ect of redistribution increases growth by providing more incentives for
risk-averse agents to become R&D entrepreneurs. Our study complements
Garcia-Penalosa and Wen (2008) by analyzing a related e¤ect of redistribu-
tion on the supply of R&D labor.
While the above studies consider the e¤ects of inequality on innovation-
driven growth through the supply side, some studies analyze the demand side
by allowing for non-homothetic preferences, e.g. indivisible consumption in
Li (1998) and hierarchical preferences in Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and
Zweimuller (2006). Zweimuller (2000) considers the market e¤ect of inequal-
ity (i.e. increasing inequality slows down the growth of market demand for
innovative goods) and nds that wealth redistribution from wealthy to poor
households increases growth. In contrast, Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) con-
sider both the market e¤ect and the price e¤ect (i.e. increasing inequality
allows the innovative goods to be sold at a higher price) and nd that the
price e¤ect dominates the market e¤ect such that wealth redistribution from
poor to wealthy households increases growth. While the demand-side result
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from Zweimuller (2000) is consistent with the supply-side results fromGarcia-
Penalosa and Wen (2008) and the present study, the result from Foellmi and
Zweimuller (2006) is not. Therefore, it becomes an empirical question as to
which e¤ect dominates in reality.9
Although the present study focuses on the e¤ects of redistribution on
innovation in the donating country, anti-poverty aid also carries other po-
tential benets, such as building up productive public infrastructure, for the
aid-receiving countries.10 As for the empirical impacts of foreign aid on the
aid-receiving countries, existing studies present inconclusive results.11 For
example, using instrumental-variable techniques, Boone (1996) nds that
foreign aid neither increase investment signicantly nor reduce poverty, and
it only increases unproductive public consumption. A subsequent and in-
uential study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggests that the impact of
aid is conditional on policy. In summary, they nd that foreign aid has a
positive impact on growth but only in developing countries that implement
good policies. However, this empirical nding has been challenged for being
data dependent. For example, Easterly et al. (2004) show that adding new
data that was unavailable to Burnside and Dollar (2000) would render their
results insignicant. In summary, whether or not foreign aid would stimu-
late growth in developing countries remains as an unresolved issue. However,
these inclusive empirical ndings do not disturb the main implication of this
study, which focuses on the potential benet of aid through increasing labor
supply and innovation in the donating country.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 denes the equilibrium and derives the dynamic prop-
erties of the balanced-growth path (BGP) and the distribution of wealth
across countries. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of redistribution on innova-
tion, growth and welfare. Section 5 provides a discussion on the theoretical
framework, and the nal section concludes.
9See Barro (2000) for a review of empirical studies that nd di¤erent results on the
growth-inequality relationship, and Barro also nds that the growth e¤ects of inequality
vary across di¤erent samples of countries.
10See, for example, Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) for a
growth-theoretic analysis of this issue.
11See Easterly (2003) for a review of this literature.
6
2 The model
The underlying quality-ladder model is based on Grossman and Helpman
(1991a).12 We extend the Grossman-Helpman model into a simple asymmet-
ric two-country setting, in which the high-income country produces innova-
tive goods (e.g. skill-intensive manufacturing products) and the low-income
country produces homogenous goods (e.g. agricultural products). This setup
captures the reality that the level of skill and human capital in the US is
higher than in the aid-receiving least developed countries. Also, we allow the
two countries to own di¤erent shares of global wealth. As for the dynamics,
we rstly show that the Euler equation implies a stationary distribution of
consumption across countries. Then, given this stationary distribution of
consumption, the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique and stable
BGP. Finally, this balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy im-
plies a stationary distribution of wealth across countries. Given that the
quality-ladder growth model has been well-studied, the familiar components
of the model will be briey described while the new features will be described
in more details.
2.1 Households
There are two countries indexed by a superscript j 2 fh; lg. Country h is
the high-income country, and country l is the low-income country. There is
a unit continuum of representative households in each country. Households
in country j have a lifetime utility function given by 13
U j =
Z 1
0
e t(lnCjt +  ln `
j
t)dt. (1)
 > 0 is the discount rate. Cjt is consumption, and `
j
t is leisure.  > 0 is a
preference parameter on leisure. Each household is endowed with one unit of
time to allocate between leisure and labor supply. The households maximize
12See, also, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for the other
pioneering studies on the quality-ladder growth model.
13The more general iso-elastic utility function U =
R1
0
e t[(Ct`

t )
1 =(1   )]dt also
features a unitary elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption. For simplic-
ity, we focus on the more tractable log utility.
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utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
:
V jt = RtV
j
t +W
j
t (1  `jt)  PtCjt . (2)
W jt is the wage rate in country j. V
j
t is the value of assets owned by house-
holds in country j. Rt is the nominal rate of return in the global nan-
cial market. Pt is the price of consumption goods that are tradable across
countries at zero transportation cost. The householdsconsumption-leisure
tradeo¤ is
W jt `
j
t = PtC
j
t . (3)
From the householdsintertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation
is :
Cjt
Cjt
=
:
Ct
Ct
= rt   . (4)
where rt  Rt  
:
P t=Pt is the real interest rate, and Ct  Cht + C lt is global
consumption. (4) implies that the distribution of consumption across the
two countries is stationary.
2.2 Consumption and nal goods
Consumption goods are produced by aggregating nal goods from the two
countries, and this sector is characterized by perfect competition.14 The
production function is Ct = (Y ht )
1 (Y lt )
, where Y ht denotes nal goods
from country h and Y lt denotes nal goods from country l. Final goods are
also tradable subject to zero transportation cost. Final goods of country l are
produced using domestic labor denoted by Lt, and the production function is
Y lt = Lt. Again, this sector is perfectly competitive, and zero prot implies
that the price of Y lt is equal to W
l
t . As for nal goods of country h, Y
h
t is
produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a unit continuum of
non-tradable di¤erentiated intermediates goods Xt(i).
Y ht = exp
Z 1
0
lnXt(i)di

. (5)
14Due to zero prot and zero transportation cost, it does not matter where consumption
goods are produced.
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This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output and
input prices as given.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Country h produces a continuum of non-tradable intermediate goods indexed
by i 2 [0; 1]. Each industry is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader,
who holds a patent on the latest invention and dominates the market until
the next invention occurs. The production function is
Xt(i) = z
nt(i)Hx;t(i). (6)
z > 1 is the exogenous size of technological improvement from each invention,
and nt(i) is the number of inventions that have occurred in industry i as of
time t. In other words, znt(i) is the level of technology in industry i at time
t. Hx;t(i) is country hs production labor in industry i. The marginal cost of
producing Xt(i) is
MCx;t(i) =W
h
t =z
nt(i). (7)
As commonly assumed in the literature, the current and former industry
leaders engage in Bertrand competition. The familiar prot-maximizing price
for the current leader is a constant markup (given by the quality step size z)
over the marginal cost.15
Px;t(i) = zMCx;t(i). (8)
2.4 R&D
Denote the value of an invention in industry i as Vt(i). Due to the Cobb-
Douglas specication in (5), the amount of prots is the same across indus-
tries (i.e. x;t(i) = x;t for i 2 [0; 1]). As a result, Vt(i) = Vt in a symmetric
equilibrium in which the arrival rate of innovation is equal across industries.
Because inventions are the only assets in the model, their aggregate value
15Li (2001) considers a CES production function. In this case, the monopolistic markup
can be determined by either the quality step size or the elasticity of substitution depending
on whether innovations are drastic or non-drastic.
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equals the global value of assets owned by all households (i.e. Vt = V ht +V
l
t ).
The familiar no-arbitrage condition for Vt is
RtVt = x;t +
:
V t   tVt. (9)
The left-hand side of (9) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side
of (9) equals the sum of (i) the prot x;t generated by this asset, (ii) the
potential capital gain
:
V t, and (iii) the expected capital loss tVt due to
creative destruction for which t is the Poisson arrival rate of innovation.
In country h, there is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by
k 2 [0; 1], and they hire R&D workers Hr;t(k) to create inventions. The
expected prot for entrepreneur k is
r;t(k) = Vtt(k) W ht Hr;t(k). (10)
The Poisson arrival rate of innovation for entrepreneur k is t(k) = 'Hr;t(k),
where ' is R&D productivity. Because of free entry, entrepreneurs earn zero
expected prot such that
Vt' = W
h
t . (11)
This condition determines the allocation of workers between production and
R&D in country h.
3 Decentralized equilibrium
In this section, we dene the market equilibrium and show that the econ-
omy is on a unique and stable BGP. The equilibrium is a sequence of prices
fRt;W ht ;W lt ; Pt; Px;t(i); V ht ; V lt ; Vtg1t=0 and a sequence of market allocations
fY ht ; Xt(i); Hx;t(i); Hr;t(k); Y lt ; Lt; `ht ; `lt; Cht ; C lt; Ctg1t=0. Also, at each instant
of time,
 households in country j choose fCjt ; `jtg to maximize utility taking
fRt; Pt;W jt g as given;
 competitive consumption-goods rms produce fCtg to maximize prot
taking prices as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms in country h produce fY ht g to maximize
prot taking prices as given;
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 competitive nal-goods rms in country l produce fY lt g to maximize
prot taking prices as given;
 the leader of industry i in country h produces fXt(i)g and chooses
fPx;t(i); Hx;t(i)g to maximize prot according to the Bertrand compe-
tition and taking fW ht g as given;
 R&D entrepreneur k chooses fHr;t(k)g to maximize expected prot
taking fW ht ; Vtg as given;
 the market for consumption goods clears such that Cht + C lt = Ct =
(Y ht )
1 (Y lt )
;
 the market for nal goods of country h clears such that Y ht = ZtHx;t,
where aggregate technology is dened as Zt  exp
R 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

;
 the market for nal goods of country l clears such that Y lt = Lt;
 the labor market in country h clears such that Hx;t +Hr;t = 1  `ht ;
 the labor market in country l clears such that Lt = 1  `lt; and
 national wealth adds up to global wealth such that V ht + V lt = Vt.
3.1 Dynamics of the aggregate economy
Dene country hs share of global consumption as sc;t  Cht =Ct. The Euler
equation in (4) implies that this share is stationary across time (i.e. sc;t = sc
for all t). Given this stationary distribution of consumption across countries,
we show that the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique and stable
BGP. Lets dene a new variable 
t  PtCt=Vt.
Lemma 1 The law of motion for 
t is given by
:

t

t
= (1 + sc   )
t   (+ '). (12)
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1 plots (12) and shows that 
t must jump to a unique steady state
given by

 =
+ '
1 + sc    . (13)
Lemma 2 shows that if 
t is constant, then the arrival rate t of innovation
would also be constant. As a result, the equilibrium allocation of R&D
labor is stationary, and aggregate technology grows at a constant rate. The
aggregate production function is
Ct = (ZtHx;t)
1 (Lt), (14)
where aggregate technology can be re-expressed as
Zt  exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
sds ln z

. (15)
The second equality in (15) uses the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the
log of (15) with respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate technology.
gt 
:
Zt=Zt = t ln z, (16)
where t = 'Hr;t. (14) implies that the balanced-growth rate of consumption
is (1  )g.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium allocation of R&D labor is stationary.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2 Distribution of wealth
Dene country hs share of global wealth as sv;t  V ht =Vt. We next show that
the distribution of wealth is stationary given the aggregate BGP.
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Lemma 3 The law of motion for sv;t is given by
:
sv;t = ((1 + sc   )
t   ')sv;t   (sc(1 + )
t   '). (17)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From (13), 
t = 
. Therefore, (17) is a one-dimensional di¤erential
equation that describes the potential evolution of sv;t given the initial sv;0.
Also, (13) implies (1 + sc   )
   ' =  > 0, so that the dynamic system
is characterized by global instability. Therefore, the only solution consistent
with long-run stability is sv;t = sv;0 for all t. Although sv;t is a state variable,
sv;0 is a stationary point by having sc jump to its appropriate value at time
0.16 In summary, the wealth distribution is stationary and equal to its initial
distribution.
4 E¤ects of wealth redistribution on growth
and welfare
In this section, we rstly derive the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor.17
Then, we examine the e¤ects of wealth redistribution implemented by a lump-
sum transfer.18
Lemma 4 The allocations of leisure and R&D labor in country h are
`h =

1 + 

1 +
sv
'

, (18)
Hr =
1
z

z   1
1 + 

1  sv
'

  
'

. (19)
Proof. See Appendix A.
16This value will be derived in the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix A.
17In the proof of Lemma 4, we also derive the equilibrium allocations of other variables.
18In section 5, we will discuss the implications of alternative nancing schemes.
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Condition R (R&D productivity) ' > 
 
sv +
1+
z 1

.
Condition R imposes a lower bound on R&D productivity to ensure that
Hr > 0. As for the properties of equilibrium R&D labor, they are in fact
quite intuitive. An increase in either the markup z or R&D productivity '
improves the incentives for R&D and hence increases R&D labor. A larger
discount rate reduces the market value of an invention and the incentives
for R&D. As leisure becomes more important (i.e. a larger ), labor supply
decreases; as a result, R&D labor also decreases. Finally, a larger wealth
share of country h reduces its householdsmarginal utility of wealth and
their labor supply; consequently, R&D labor decreases.
Proposition 1 A decrease in the wealth share of country h stimulates inno-
vation and growth.
Proof. See (16) and (19).
We next analyze the relationship between global wealth inequality and
growth. It can be shown that the variance of national wealth share is v =
(sv   0:5)2. The square root of v is the coe¢ cient of variation of wealth,
which is a common measure of wealth inequality. Given that v is an U-shape
function in sv and growth is decreasing in sv, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 When country h owns more (less) than half the wealth in the
world, growth and global wealth inequality are negatively (positively) related.
Proof. See Figure 2.
We next examine the e¤ects of global wealth redistribution on welfare.
Specically, we would like to know whether a decrease in the wealth share of
country h can increase its householdswelfare. Given the balanced-growth
behavior of the economy, (1) simplies to
U j =
1


lnCj0 + (1  )
g

+  ln `j

, (20)
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where Ch0 = scC0, C
l
0 = (1   sc)C0, and C0 = (Z0Hx)1 (L). Substituting
these conditions into (20) and dropping the exogenous Z0 yield
Uh = ln sc +  lnL+ (1  ) lnHx + (1  )g

+  ln `h (21)
for households in country h. As for households in country l, simply replace
sc by 1  sc and `h by `l. Di¤erentiating (21) with respect to sv yields 19

@Uh
@sv
=
1
sc

@sc
@sv

| {z }
>0
+

L

@L
@sv

| {z }
>0
+
1  
Hx

@Hx
@sv

| {z }
<0
+
1  


@g
@sv

| {z }
<0
+

`h

@`h
@sv

| {z }
>0
.
(22)
A redistribution of wealth from country h to country l (i.e. a decrease in
sv) would decrease country h householdsshare of global consumption sc and
their leisure `h that lead to a welfare loss in country h. However, it would
also increase Hx and Hr that raise global output and growth respectively; as
a result, they lead to a welfare gain. As for L = 1   `l, there are opposing
e¤ects from a smaller sv. On one hand, the increase in 1  sv would increase
the leisure of households in country l and reduce their labor supply at a
given wage. On the other hand, the increase in Hx increases the marginal
product of L and hence W lt . It turns out that the wealth e¤ect dominates
the wage e¤ect so that the overall e¤ect on L is negative. Although there
are di¤erent e¤ects of sv on Uh, Proposition 3 shows that if the discount
rate  is su¢ ciently low or R&D productivity ' is su¢ ciently high, then
the growth e¤ect dominates other e¤ects such that @Uh=@sv < 0. In this
case, country h surprisingly benets from giving away some of their wealth
to country l because the equilibrium growth rate is ine¢ ciently low. As for
country l, Proposition 3 shows that if country h benets from transferring
some of their wealth to country l, then country l must also benet from this
transfer.
Proposition 3 If  is su¢ ciently small or ' is su¢ ciently large, then wealth
redistribution from country h to country l (i.e. a decrease in sv) would in-
crease the welfare of both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.
19The signs of these derivatives will be derived in the proof of Proposition 3.
15
To have a better understanding of Proposition 3, we derive the Pareto
e¢ cient allocation of R&D labor. We consider the case in which the social
planner directly chooses the allocations to maximize Uh + (1  )U l, where
 2 (0; 1) is an exogenous preference weight on country h.
Lemma 5 The Pareto e¢ cient allocation of R&D labor is
H^r = 1 



1   + 1


' ln z
. (23)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the proof of Lemma 5, we also compare (19) and (23) and nd that a
small value of =' is a su¢ cient condition for H^r > Hr (i.e. R&D underin-
vestment), in which case the wealth transfer that stimulates innovation could
lead to a Pareto improvement.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss a number of issues related to the theoretical frame-
work. To derive closed-form solutions, we have kept the model simple and
tractable by assuming an exogenous trade pattern (i.e. the high-income
country produces innovative goods while the low-income country produces
homogenous goods) and ruling out the possibility of shifting the production
of innovative goods to the low-income country for two reasons. Firstly, most
of the least-developed aid-receiving countries lack the necessary human cap-
ital for adapting foreign technology. Secondly, this simplication allows the
open-economy model with two countries to be viewed as a closed-economy
model with two types of households, who supply di¤erent labor inputs. Con-
sequently, the redistribution e¤ects are readily comparable with those in the
literature on inequality and innovation. Furthermore, the present study as-
sumes that the aid-receiving country produces non-innovative goods without
the possibility of imitation, technology transfer through multinational rms,
and domestic innovation. This setup reects the reality of providing anti-
poverty aid to the least developed countries that have limited capacity to
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engage in the kind of (i) imitative R&D analyzed in Grossman and Helpman
(1991b), (ii) adaptive R&D for technology transfer analyzed in Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2009) and (iii) innovative R&D analyzed in Grossman and
Lai (2004).
A second issue to consider is that foreign aid usually takes the form of
income transfer rather than wealth transfer. In the model, we consider a
redistribution of wealth simply to make our study more in line with the lit-
erature on inequality and innovation. However, the one-time wealth transfer
is equivalent to a permanent income transfer. To see this, suppose the high-
income country transfers an amount of income T to the low-income country
in each period, and this amount is nanced by a lump-sum tax  . Then, it
can be shown that leisure in the high-income country becomes 20
`h =

1 + 

1 +
sv
'
  

. (24)
Therefore, the transfer of income continues to have the desired e¤ect of re-
ducing leisure and increasing labor supply in the innovative country.
A third and related issue is about the distortionary e¤ects of taxation.
The previous discussion assumes the presence of a lump-sum tax, which is
rarely available. In the case of distortionary taxes, the result that an income
transfer leads to an increase in labor supply may no longer hold. Indeed, we
nd that an income transfer nanced by a tax on wage income would lead to
a decrease in labor supply. Similarly, an income transfer nanced by a tax
on asset income would cause a labor reallocation from R&D to production
because the higher interest rate reduces the market value of inventions. As
for a consumption tax, it will leave the equilibrium allocations of leisure,
production labor and R&D labor unchanged. Therefore, none of these tax
instruments deliver the original result. To restore the result, we can consider
a tax on production-labor income. In this case, an income transfer nanced
by the production-labor-income tax would increase R&D labor and poten-
tially improve country hs welfare at a su¢ ciently low discount rate or high
R&D productivity.21 Furthermore, it is not unrealistic for production-labor
income and R&D-labor income to be subject to di¤erent tax rates because
in reality, R&D is often carried out by entrepreneurs, whose income can be
taxed di¤erently. Therefore, if the income of production workers is subject
20See Appendix B (an unpublished appendix) for the derivation of this result.
21See Appendix B (an unpublished appendix) for the derivation of this result.
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to a higher tax rate, then more individuals would choose to become R&D
entrepreneurs instead.
Finally, we have sidestepped the issue of scale e¤ects by normalizing the
supply of labor in the high-income country to unity.22 In this case, the
population size no longer appears in the equilibrium growth rate; instead,
it is the supply of labor that a¤ects growth. In other words, when R&D
scientists and engineers devote more time to research, they will generate
more innovation. We believe that this implication is intuitive and plausible.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of a global
wealth redistribution. Even focusing on the innovation e¤ect in the donat-
ing country, this study suggests that international transfers can (i) increase
growth, (ii) reduce global inequality and (iii) possibly lead to a Pareto im-
provement. We should emphasize that whether a Pareto improvement would
occur depends on a number of factors, such as the extent of R&D underin-
vestment in the market economy as well as the empirical wealth elasticity
of labor supply. These issues remain as empirical questions. However, even
if a Pareto improvement does not occur, this outcome would not invalidate
the main result of this paper that there is an unexplored benet (through
elastic labor supply and innovation), which reduces the welfare cost for the
developed countries to provide anti-poverty aid. Therefore, critiques of anti-
poverty aid may want to take into account these benets for the US.
22See Jones (1999) for an excellent discussion on scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth
models.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (3) into (2) and aggregating the resulting
expression for the two countries yield
:
V t = RtVt +W
h
t +W
l
t   (1 + )PtCt. (A1)
We next derive a relationship between W lt and PtCt. Combining W
l
t `
l
t =
PtC
l
t from (3) andW
l
t (1  `lt) =W ltLt = PtCt from the homogenous-goods
share of global output yields
W lt = [(1  sc) + ]PtCt, (A2)
where 1 sc;t  C lt=Ct is stationary as implied by (4). Taking the log of 
t 
PtCt=Vt and then di¤erentiating it with respect to time yields
:

t

t
=
:
P t
Pt
+
:
Ct
Ct
 
:
V t
Vt
. (A3)
Substituting (4), (11), (A1) and (A2) into (A3) yields (12).
Proof of Lemma 2. The prot share of global output is x;t = (1  
)PtCt(z 1)=z. Given that 
t is constant from Lemma 1, PtCt and Vt must
grow at the same (possibly zero) rate. Applying this condition and (4) to (9)
yields Vt = x;t=(+ t). Using these conditions, we can derive that

t  PtCt
Vt
=
1
1  

z
z   1

(+ t). (A4)
Therefore, if 
t is constant, then t = 'Hr;t must also be constant.
Proof of Lemma 3. From its denition, the law of motion for sv;t  V ht =Vt
is given by
:
sv;t
sv;t
=
:
V ht
V ht
 
:
V t
Vt
=
W ht   (1 + )PtCht
V ht
  W
h
t +W
l
t   (1 + )PtCt
Vt
, (A5)
where the second equality uses (2), (3) and (A1). Substituting (11) and (A2)
into (A5) and performing a few steps of mathematical manipulation yield
:
sv;t =

(1 + sc   )PtCt
Vt
  '

sv;t  

(1 + )sc
PtCt
Vt
  '

. (A6)
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Substituting 
t  PtCt=Vt into (A6) yields (17).
Proof of Lemma 4. Choosing W ht as the numeraire implies that Vt =
W ht =' = 1=' for all t so that
:
V t = 0. The stationarity of the wealth
distribution implies that
:
V t =
:
V ht =
:
V lt = 0. Imposing these conditions,
(4) and (11) on (2) yields
PtC
h
t = (sv + '(1  `ht ))Vt, (A7)
PtC
l
t = ((1  sv) + '(1  `lt)!t)Vt, (A8)
where !t  W lt=W ht = W lt is the relative wage (to be determined below).
Substituting (11), (A7) and (A8) into (3) yields
`ht =

1 + 

1 +
sv
'

, (A9)
`lt =

1 + 

1 +
(1  sv)
'!t

. (A10)
Country hs production-labor share of global output is W ht Hx;t = (1  
)PtCt=z, and the prot share of global output is x;t = (1 )PtCt(z 1)=z.
Applying these conditions, Vt = x;t=(+ t) and t = 'Hr;t to (11) yields
(z   1)Hx;t = Hr;t + ='. (A11)
Combining (A9), (A11) and Hx;t +Hr;t = 1  `ht yields
Hr;t =
1
z

z   1
1 + 

1  sv
'

  
'

, (A12)
Hx;t =
1
z

1
1 + 

1  sv
'

+

'

. (A13)
Combining W ht Hx;t = (1  )PtCt=z and W ltLt = PtCt yields
!t =
z
1  

Hx;t
Lt

=
1
1  



1 +

'

+ 
(1  sv)
'

, (A14)
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where the last equality is obtained by using Lt = 1   `lt, (A10) and (A13).
Finally, combining (13), (17) and
:
sv;t = 0 yields
sc =
(1  )(sv + ')
(1 + )(+ ')  (sv + ') . (A15)
Note that if sv = 1, then sc = 1   . Furthermore, as sv decreases, sc also
decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (A15), we can show that
@ ln sc
@sv
=

sv + '
+

(1 + )(+ ')  (sv + ') > 0. (A16)
Also, @ ln sc=@sv approaches zero as ! 0 or '!1. Using (A13), we can
show that
(1  )@ lnHx
@sv
=  


1 + 
(1  )
'

=

1
1 + 

1  sv
'

+

'

< 0.
(A17)
Note that Condition R implies 1 sv=' > 0. Also, @ lnHx=@sv approaches
zero as ! 0 or '!1. Using (A12), we can show that
1  


@g
@sv
= (1 )

' ln z


@Hr
@sv
=  (1 )


1 + 

z   1
z

ln z < 0,
(A18)
which is independent of  and '. Using (A9), we can show that

@ ln `h
@sv
= 


'+ sv

> 0, (A19)
which approaches zero as ! 0 or '!1. Using (A10) and L = 1  `l, we
can show that

@ lnL
@sv
=

!'  (1  sv)

1 +

1  sv
!

@!
@sv

. (A20)
As for @!=@sv, we can use (A14) to show that
@!
@sv
=   1
1  


'

< 0. (A21)
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Substituting (A14) and (A21) into (A20) shows that @ lnL=@sv is positive
and approaches zero as ! 0 or '!1. Therefore, if either  is su¢ ciently
small or ' is su¢ ciently large, then the growth e¤ect of wealth redistribution
dominates the other e¤ects such that country h benets from transferring
some wealth to country l. As for country ls welfare,

@U l
@sv
=   1
1  sc

@sc
@sv

| {z }
<0
+

L

@L
@sv

| {z }
>0
+
1  
Hx

@Hx
@sv

| {z }
<0
+
1  


@g
@sv

| {z }
<0
+

`l

@`l
@sv

| {z }
<0
.
(A22)
Comparing (22) and (A22) shows that @Uh=@sv < 0 is a su¢ cient condition
for @U l=@sv < 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. The social planner chooses Ch0 , C
l
0, `
h, `l and Hx to
maximize
(Uh + (1  )U l) (A23)
=  lnCh0 + (1  ) lnC l0 +

1  


g +  ln `h + (1  ) ln `l
subject to (i) Ch0 + C
l
0 = C0 = (Z0Hx)
1 (L), (ii) g = (' ln z)Hr, (iii)
Hx + Hr = 1   `h, and (iv) L = 1   `l. Denote the Lagrange function by
  = (Uh+(1 )U l)+(C0 Ch0  C l0), where  is the Lagrange multiplier.
The rst-order conditions are
@ 
@Ch0
=

Ch0
   = 0, (A24)
@ 
@C l0
=
1  
C l0
   = 0, (A25)
@ 
@`h
=  (1  )

' ln z


+ 


`h

= 0, (A26)
@ 
@`l
= (1  )


`l

  

C0
1  `l

= 0, (A27)
@ 
@Hx
=  (1  )

' ln z


+ (1  )

C0
Hx

= 0. (A28)
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(A24) and (A25) imply that  = 1=C0. Then, combining this condition with
Hx + Hr = 1   `h, (A26) and (A28) yields (23). Comparing (19) and (23)
yields
H^r > Hr ()

1 

1
1 + 

z   1
z

| {z }
A>0
(A29)
>




1  

1
ln z
+
z   ln z
z ln z
  
1 + 

z   1
z

sv

| {z }
B

'
There are two cases to consider. First, if B > 0, then =' < A=B is equiva-
lent to H^r > Hr. Second, if B < 0, then H^r > Hr always holds. This second
case becomes more likely to occur as z increases because B is decreasing in
z.
27
Appendix B (unpublished appendix)
In this appendix, we derive the e¤ects of a permanent income transfer T
nanced by (i) a lump-sum tax  or (ii) a production-labor-income tax x.
We rstly show that an increase in either  or x would lead to an increase in
R&D labor Hr. Lets begin by rewriting the budget constraint of households
in the high-income country as
:
V ht = RtV
h
t + (1  x)W hx;tHx +W hr;tHr;t   PtCht    , (B1)
whereW hx;t andW
h
r;t are the pre-tax wage rates of production labor and R&D
labor respectively. The householdsconsumption-leisure choice is given by
W hr;t`
h
t = PtC
h
t . (B2)
Also, in equilibrium, (1  x)W hx;t = W hr;t. The zero-expected-prot condition
from the R&D sector is Vt' = W hr;t. Therefore, choosingHr;t as the numeraire
implies that
:
V t = 0. Furthermore, the stationarity of the wealth distribution
implies that
:
V t =
:
V ht =
:
V lt = 0. As a result, (B1) becomes
PtC
h
t = RtV
h
t +W
h
r;t(1  `ht )   . (B3)
Along the balanced-growth path, Rt = . Substituting this condition and
(B2) into (B3) yields
`h =

1 + 

1 +
sv
'
  

. (B4)
The production-labor share of global output isW hx;tHx;t = (1 )PtCt=z, and
the prot share of global output is x;t = (1   )PtCt(z   1)=z. Applying
these conditions, Vt = x;t=( + t); t = 'Hr;t and (1   x)W hx;t = W hr;t to
Vt' = W
h
r;t yields
(z   1)Hx = (1  x)(Hr + ='). (B5)
Combining (B4), (B5) and the labor-market-clearing condition Hx + Hr =
1  `h yields
Hr =
1
z   x

z   1
1 + 

1  sv
'
+ 

  (1  x) 
'

. (B6)
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In summary, an increase in T nanced by a lump-sum tax  would lead to
a decrease in leisure `h and hence an increase in R&D labor Hr. As for
an increase in the production-labor-income tax x, it would lead to a labor
reallocation from production to R&D, so that Hr increases as well.
Finally, we briey sketch out how the increase in Hr from a larger x can
lead to an increase in welfare in country h. Given that elastic labor supply
is not the crucial element in this case, we will demonstrate this result under
inelastic labor supply. Di¤erentiating Uh with respect to x yields

@Uh
@x
=
1
sc

@sc
@x

| {z }
<0
+
1  
Hx

@Hx
@x

| {z }
<0
+
1  


@g
@x

| {z }
>0
. (B7)
Setting  = 0 in (B6) yields
g = (' ln z)Hr =
' ln z
z   x

z   1  (1  x) 
'

. (B8)
As for Hx, it is given by
Hx = 1 Hr = 1  x
z   x

1 +

'

. (B9)
The consumption expenditure in country l is
PtC
l
t = V
l +W l + T =
(1  sv)
'
+ ! + T , (B10)
where !  W l=W hr = W l and
! + T =

z
1  

W hxHx + xW
h
xHx =

z
1   + x

1
z   x

1 +

'

.
(B11)
Combining (B3) and (B10) yields
sc =
Cht
Ct
=
1 + sv='
1 + ='+ ! + T
. (B12)
Substituting these conditions into (B7) shows that for a su¢ ciently small
=', the growth e¤ect dominates the other e¤ects so that @Uh=@x > 0.
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